Introduction
Expected utility theory, rst axiomatized by v on Neumann and Morgenstern 33], was considered for many y ears to be the only acceptable normative theory for decision making under risk. von Neumann and Morgenstern assumed the existence of probabilities, but it was soon proved that this assumption is unnecessary, and the theory is meaningful even with subjective probabilities (see Savage 29] and Edwards 8] ). Despite the experimental criticism of this theory (e.g. Allais 2] or MacCrimmon and Larsson 21]), it was not until the late 1970's that serious alternatives to this theory were offered (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 17] or Machina 22] ). The most popular of these alternatives, called the rank-dependent utility model (Quiggin 27] see also further references in Section 2 below), assumes that decision makers maximize an expected utility-type functional, where instead of the original distribution function they use a (subjective) transformation of this function. Another interpretation of this idea suggests that decision maker use nonadditive probabilities (Schmeidler 30] . For some recent applications and axiomatizations of these theories and their extensions, see Abdellaoui One of the strongest arguments against using non expected utility models is that they lead to Dutch books, that is, to situations where a decision maker can be manipulated to lose money with probability one (see Machina 24] ). In the context of non-additive probabilities, this claim is based on the following argument b y de Finetti 7] . A set of odds posted by a bookie is coherent if it is impossible to make a sure pro t by betting against the bookie. de Finetti 7, p. 63], among others, has argued that it is] precisely this condition of coherence which constitutes the sole principle from which one can deduce the whole calculus of probability: this calculus then appears as a set of rules to which the subjective e v aluation of probability o f v arious events by the same individual ought to conform if there is not to be a fundamental contradiction among them. The basis for this claim is the following theorem due originally to de Finetti. A set of odds is coherent if and only if they are derived f r om a nitely additive probability measure. ( A v ery general version of this result may b e found in Heath and Sudderth 16] ). To illustrate, assume that a bookie posts odds of 1 3 on A, 1 3 on B, but 1 2 on A B, e v en though A \ B = ?. Then a smart bettor will sell the bookie a bet that pays $1 if A happens, charging her 1 3 ; ", he will sell her another bet that pays $1 if B happens for the same price, and pay h e r 1 2 + " for a bet that pays $1 is A B happens. For " < 1 18 , the bettor ends up with a sure gain of 1 6 ; 3" > 0.
de Finetti's argument is normative. It does not necessarily apply to actual behavior, but is more about an individual's beliefs. Such beliefs are normatively acceptable if the individual knows that it is impossible to exploit money out of her, and de Finetti shows that this requirement is satis ed by posting coherent odds, that is, odds that behave l i k e a probability function. We d o not wish to argue with the normative appeal of de Finetti's argument, but would like to ask another question: Is it true that a bookie with incoherent odds will be exploited, in the sense that she will necessarily lose money? As mentioned above, this claim is often cited against some of the current models used by psychologists and economists, where non-additive representations of beliefs are sometimes employed. The question whether such preferences must lead to bankruptcy is a practical, rather than a normative question. As we show below, when bookies act strategically, i t m a y w ell be optimal for them to post incoherent odds. There is no contradiction between de nition's analysis and our results. de Finneti is seeking immunization against all possible bettors, while we deal with a situation where the bookie interacts with a given set of bettors.
Consider again the requirement`a set of rules to which the subjective evaluation of probability : : :ought to conform,' not as a normative rule (with which w e agree), but as a practical one. There are two b e h a vioral interpretations we can make of this statement. One is that being in a betting environment forces a bookie to post odds in a way that makes her appear to have a subjective probability. The other is that she has a subjective probability and that placing her in a betting environment enables us to uncover her beliefs. This second interpretation is clearly awed. In a betting environment t h e bookie does not bet, but serves as a go-between, enabling bettors to trade bets between themselves. Of course, in a free market with full information, the bettors do not need the bookie, but we assume here that bettors can only buy (and sell) bets from and to the bookie. For example, if one bettor believes that the probability of a certain event A is 3 4 , while another bettor believes this probability t o b e 1 4 , the bookie will announce her willingness to sell and buy, for a nominal fee, bets of $1 on A that pay $ 2 i f A happens. The rst bettor will bet on A and the second bettor will sell the bookie a bet on A. I f A happens, the second bettor pays the bookie $2 that she in turn pays back to the rst bettor, if A does not happen no further payments are made.
In all cases the bookie nets the betting fees. Note that these calculations were made regardless of the bookie beliefs.
But even if the bookie has to bet, it will be wrong to conclude her beliefs from her rates, since the rate-xing bookie is acting as a monopolist. For example, if the bookie believes that the probability of the event A is 1 3 , but bettors believe that the probability of this event i s 1 2 , then her best strategy is to set the odds on A at 1 2 ; ". The bettors will thus bet on A, a n d each dollar bet on A equals, from the bookie's perspective, to the lottery ). The expected value of this lottery is (almost) 1 3 (see also Corollary 1 below for a formal presentation of these claims).
In this paper we p o i n t out that as a behavioral rule, the rst interpretation su ers from a related aw. It ignores the fact that the odds ratio posted by a bookie is merely a strategic decision in a game being played against the pool of bettors. What we need to do is examine the equilibria of the underlying betting game in order to draw conclusions about the equilibrium odds. Below w e show h o w to construct environments in which this betting game has subgame perfect equilibrium with incoherent odds, even though all players possess additive probabilities.
It is true that these incoherent odds leave the bookie vulnerable to arbitrage | it's just that our particular collection of bettors does not nd this arbitrage opportunity to be their most attractive collection of bets. If the bettors were only to concentrate on the sure gain, they would have to behave in a maximin fashion, behavior which most decision theorists would reject. Once the game theoretic nature of Dutch book interactions is recognized, all bets are o as to the kind of behavior we should expect to see.
Naturally, there are some unusual things about these environments. We do not assume that the actual odds are common knowledge, or even commonly held. Indeed a di erence of opinion is necessary for our structure. The second thing that we need that is a bit unusual is that our bettors are not expected utility maximizers. This does not bother us, since there is plenty of evidence that many decision makers do violate the predictions of expected utility theory (see, for example, Kahneman 
and Tversky 17], MacCrimmon and Larsson 21], and Machina 23]).
A bookie who is interested in choosing the best strategy while confronting other people has to take t h e b e h a vior of her opponent a s g i v en. Even if she herself follows the rules of expected utility theory (as we assume below), it will be foolish for her to act as though everyone else also follows this theory, w h e n t h e y d o n o t .
The claims of the paper should be understood as being practical and behavioral, and not as normative statements. Since there is a growing literature (both in psychology and economics) of models that use non additive representations of beliefs, we think that it is important t o s h o w that these models cannot be dismissed on the false grounds that \everyone who follows these models will go bankrupt." We relate our analysis to this literature, and to the literature on dynamic consistency and Dutch books, in Section 5 below.
A Game Theoretic Analysis
We consider the following simple situation. There are two disjoint e v ents A and B which exhaust the set of possible states. The bookie, who is an expected utility maximizer, posts prices a and b for one dollar bets on A and B respectively. Bettors place bets after the prices are posted. A bettor may either buy or sell bets at the posted prices. For our purposes we assume that there are two bettors, and that the bookie knows their preferences (over uncertain prospects) and their beliefs (concerning the likelihood of the two events A and B). 1 We impose the following budget constraint on the bettors. Each bettor has only one dollar and is not permitted to buy on credit nor is he allowed to sell a bet (buy a negative q u a n tity) unless he proves that he possesses su cient funds to pay o in the event he loses. The fact that (x ŷ) is a function from S to R 2 re ects the fact that the bettor decides how m uch to bet only after he learns the rates a and b. 1 Alternatively, w e m a y assume that there is a single bettor, but that the bookie has some doubt about its identity. She believes that there is an even chance that this single bettor is one of the above t wo bettors. Since the bookie is assumed to maximize expected utility, her behavior in both environments will be the same (see Harsanyi 15] ).
To complete the description of the game we need to specify payo s as a function of the strategies. Let U(a b x 1 y 1 x 2 y 2 ) denote the bookie's payo , and let V i (a b x 1 y 1 x 2 y 2 ) denote the payo of bettor i. Since each bettor's payo depends only on his own bets, for simplicity w e will write V i (a b x i y i ).
The bookie moves rst, so the appropriate equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium.
De nition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium, o r equilibrium for brevity, of the two bettor game is a vector (a b x 1 ŷ 1 x 2 ŷ 2 ) in S T T satisfying:
1. Bettors maximize their payo taking a and b as given. That is, for each bettor i and for all (a b) in S, The outline of the game is therefore this:
The bookie announces rates a and b at which she is willing to either buy or sell bets. Each bettor with a budget constraint of $1 will buy and sell bets at the posted odds so as to maximize his utility. Now that the bookie knows the lottery she will face for each g i v en pair of odds a and b, she will choose a and b to maximize her utility.
For the remainder of our results, the players are assumed to evaluate lotteries using one of the following three functionals. We explain the choice of these functionals at the end of the section.
Rank-Dependent Utility (Quiggin 27] The value of each part is computed by taking the expected utility w i t h r e s p e c t to distortions of the distribution function. Di erent distortion functions may be used for the positive and the negative parts of the distribution. Obviously, this model is more general than the rank-dependent utility m o d e l , w h e r e t h e same distortion function is used for the whole distribution. For a random variable taking on only two v alues, x < y , with probabilities q and 1 ; q, t h e formula for the value reduces to V (x q y 1 ; q) = u(x)g(q) + u(y)h(1 ; q)
If xy > 0, then h(1 ; q) = 1 ; g(q), which is the functional form of eq. (2), but if xy < 0 (that is, x < 0 < y ), then h(1 ; q) m a y be di erent from 1 ; g(q). Disappointment A v ersion (Gul 12 ]. This theory is by itself a special case of Chew's 5] semi-weighted utility theory). According to this theory, the value of a lottery is given by
where is the probability t h a t F yields an outcome above its certainty equivalent C(F), and ( ) = = 1 + (1 ; ) ] for some number .
According to disappointment a version theory, the decision maker evaluates outcomes that are better than the certainty e q u i v alent of a lottery by using an expected utility functional with a utility function u. He similarly evaluates outcomes that are worse than the certainty equivalent. Finally, t h e value of a lottery is a weighted sum of these two e v aluations.
For a random variable taking on only two v alues, x < y , with probabilities q and 1 ; q, the formula for the value reduces to the functional of eq. (2), where g(q) = ( 1 ; p)(1 ; )= 1 + (1 ; p)].
What is common to these three functionals is that they are not smooth at x = y. Suppose, for example, that q = 1 2 , and di erentiate the right-hand side of eq. (2) with respect to x ; at x = y to obtain u 0 (x)g(q), while the derivative with respect to y In the sequel we use eq. (2). Since it is special case of eq. (3), we obtain that our analysis can be applied to all of the above models. 
Assuming the functional form of eq. (2), the bettor's payo s are given in Table 1 . The next lemma simpli es the analysis of the bettors' best response behavior.
Lemma 1 If u is (weakly) convex and if a + b 6 1, then a bettor's optimal response is to Plunge by betting everything on A or on B, or else Hedge by betting so as to receive the same payo in either event. The payo s are g i v e n in Table 2 .
Proof Suppose that x=a < y=b. Hence the bettor should increase the outcome y b ;x;y to its highest possible level by setting y = 1 ; x (see the rst case in Table 1 ). Since u is convex, optimization leads to a corner solution, that is, either y = 1 (and x = 0 ) , o r x=a = y=b. Similarly, i f x=a > y=b, then the bettor should set x = 1, or fall back t o x=a = y=b.
The bettor's optimal strategy depends on which of the three options in Table 2 Since g is concave, > . Simple calculations prove the next lemma. Lemma 2 If a bettor's utility function u is linear and his probability transformation function g is concave, then his optimal strategies are:
Plunge on A whenever b=a > Plunge on B whenever b=a 6 Hedge whenever 6 b=a 6 .
These strategies are depicted in Figure 1 .
Note that when g is linear, that is, when the bettor is risk neutral, = and he will buy either on A or on B, but not on both, unless b=a = = , in which case he is indi erent b e t ween all three strategies. In the special case of identical expected value maximizing bettors, the bookie will set the prices equal to the bettors' subjective probabilities, so that they are indi erent among all bets. Otherwise, the bettors will bet everything on the event whose price is less than its subjective probability, and the bookie bene ts by raising the price of this event. In this case, the bookie's prices are the bettor's subjective probabilities, not her own.
Corollary 1 With only one type o f b ettor, if u and g are l i n e ar (i.e., the bettor is an expected value maximizer), then the equilibrium strategy of the bookie is to set a = q and b = 1 ; q (q and 1 ; q are the bettor's subjective probability of A and B).
In light of Theorem 1, if we w ant to create an equilibrium situation where a + b < 1, it must be the case that not all utility functions are linear. From Table 2 we learn that the bettor:
Prefers to plunge on A than to plunge on B i u(;1)g(1 ; q) + u 1 ; a a 1 ; g(1 ; q)] > 
These equations determine the sets of (a b) pairs marking the bettor's indi erence between each pair of strategies. For reasons that will become clear soon, we w ould like these border lines to be as in the left panel of Figure 2 . In that case, the areas where each of the three strategies is optimal are as depicted on the right panel of this gure. The regions are labelled with It is not hard to come up with numerical examples that will lead to such a picture. Note that the transitivity of indi erence guarantees that if two of these curves intersect, then all three of them intersect at the same point. Denote = 1 ; g(1 ; q) and = 1 ; g(q), and assume wlg that u(;1) = 0.
Rewriting eq. ; b (12) The following example will produce curves as in Figure 2 . Let the utility u for a bettor be of the following form. The parameters s and t depend only on the bettor's belief q and his preferences through g. B y c hoosing q and the concave function g carefully, w e c a n choose s and t to be arbitrary positive n umbers.
Eq. (10) Remark Although our analysis was done with respect to only three functional forms (rank-dependent utility, c u m ulative prospect theory, and disappointment a version), it is clear how it can be extended to more general utility functions. In order to create areas as in Figure 2 , we need to evaluate the lottery of eq. (6) by using a functional form such that for the set of bets satisfying x + y = k, the functional is convex in x, and has a kink at the point x = ay=b. The convexity is needed to guarantee that the bettor will either bet on A, o r o n B. The kink is needed to make sure that hedging may also be optimal. Such a kink is closely related to the concept of rst order risk aversion (see Segal and Spivak 31] ), a condition that is satis ed by all three functional forms discussed above.
The Bookie's Optimal Strategy
Suppose that when the bettor is indi erent b e t ween plunging and hedging, the bettor will plunge. (This will turn out to be the case in our equilibrium.) Even in this case, if there is only one bettor, the logic that when the bettor is plunging, the bookie wants to raise the price of the bettor's bet and when he's hedging, the bookie wants to raise both prices, drives the equilibrium prices to satisfy a + b = 1. Of course, since the boundary lines are nonlinear, the bookie may h a ve t o c hange the price ratio while raising the prices. It is this phenomenon that allows us to construct an equilibrium with a + b < 1. Since the set of directions in which w e can raise prices depends on the prices, if there are heterogeneous bettors, these sets of directions may n o t overlap. That is, it may be impossible to raise prices and keep both bettors making the same bets.
Suppose that the bookie is maximizing an expected utility functional and that there are two bettors, I and II, with optimal strategies as indicated in Figure 3 . There are ve p o i n ts of special interest, labelled P, Q, R, S, a n d T. Point Q has the largest a for which both bettors will plunge on A, a n d p o i n t T has the largest b for which both bettors will plunge on B. A t p o i n t R, Bettor I hedges while II plunges on A. A t S, I plunges on B, while II hedges. The segment joining R and S has both bettors hedging. Finally, a t p o i n t P, Bettor I is plunging on B and Bettor II is plunging on A. I t i s e a s y t o see that the bookie's expected utility will be maximized a t o n e o f P, Q, T, or on the segment RS. Letting p and 1 ; p denote the bookie's subjective probabilities of A and B, her expected utilities are given in Table 3 .
It is possible to choose values for p, s I , t I , k I , s II , t II , and k II , a n d a concave increasing utility u for the bookie so that point P has the highest expected utility. F or instance, choose k I = 2 :857, k II = 1 , s I = 2 8 :57, t I = 1 , s II = 3 , t II = 12 ( Figure 3 is based on these values, although it is not drawn to scale) and p = :2. For the bookie's utility c hoose u(x) = ( x x > ;2 4x + 6x 6 ;2:
Then to three decimal places, the bookie's expected utilities are given in Table 4 . In the equilibrium of this game the bookie chooses P and does not post additive prices. To be fair, there is another equilibrium, where the bettors hedge when indi erent, in which the bookie posts additive prices and her expected utility is zero. Our point is that there is at least one equilibrium (in fact the bookie's favorite) in which she sets non additive prices.
Conclusions
In a related paper 4] w e pointed out that strategic behavior on the part of the bookie may eliminate the Dutch book argument against violations of the law of conditional probability. The analysis there too involves two bettors (with di erent beliefs). A major di erence between the results of the current paper and the results obtained in 4] is that here, at least in one equilibrium situation, the bookie's optimal strategy must involve a violation of probability theory. In 4], on the other hand, the most we can get is a situation where posting non-multiplicative rates is as good as using multiplicative o n e s .
Several recent nonexpected utility models are based on the assumption that decision makers do not obey some of the basic rules of probability theory. Schmeidler 30] and Gilboa 10] present models of behavior with non additive probabilities. One possible interpretation of the rank-dependent utility model (Quiggin 27] ) is that it distorts the probabilities in such a w ay t h a t in a neighborhood of ;2 without changing any of the relevant expected utilities. Thus we could specify di erentiable utility with the same equilibrium. their values are no longer additive. This is clearly the meaning of the probability w eighting function of Kahneman and Tversky's 17] prospect theory. I t is this intuition that is carried over into their cumulative model 32]. We d o not claim that the reason for these violations is that people behave strategically. Nor do we w ant to suggest that the correct interpretation of the above mentioned models is game theoretic. However, we believe that these models and empirical evidence cannot be rejected as irrelevant on the grounds that violations of probability theory expose the decision maker to a Dutch book. All of these models analyze the behavior of a single agent. Dutch books must involve at least two agents, therefore the correct framework is game theoretic, and one must assume that agents behave strategically. T raditional analyses of Dutch books assume that the person o ering choices to the subject is much more sophisticated than the subject. Our approach is more symmetric in that the bookie is at least as sophisticated as the bettors.
Our major claim is that when people behave strategically, that is, when they are willing to deliberately misrepresent their beliefs and tastes in order to exploit some possible gains from trade, it is wrong to interpret the betting rates they announce as their subjective probabilities of the di erent events. Instead, these rates should be understood as the prices at which subjects are willing to trade certain goods (simple lotteries tickets). If the market is non-competitive and prices are manipulable by a g e n ts|and the framework of Dutch books is basically non-competitive|then the observed rates at which subjects are willing to exchange goods typically do not equal their true subjective rates (known in the economic literature as the marginal rate of substitution).
The idea that rules of behavior can be justi ed by Dutch books is not restricted to probability theory. In recent y ears there was a growing body of literature on the employment o f D u t c h books in enforcing dynamic consistency (see e.g. Green 11 ], Hammond 13, 14] Hammond 13, 14] , and Border and Segal 3]), or they o er alternative de nitions of dynamic consistency that do not expose decision makers to Dutch b o o k s . None of these models assumes strategic behavior on the side of the decision maker. The analysis of such a b e h a vior may w ell change our view of dynamic consistency.
